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Remarks on Fodor on having concepts
Mind and Language 19 (1):48-56 (2004)
Abstract
Fodor offers a novel argument against Bare-bones Concept Pragmatism (BCP). He alleges that there are two circularities in BCP’s account of concept possession: a circularity in explaining concept possession in terms of the capacity to sort; and a circularity in explaining concept possession in terms of the capacity to draw inferences. We argue that neither of these circles is real.Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
Dispositional properties and counterfactual conditionals.Sungho Choi - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):795-841.
Primitive Concepts and the Ontological Question.Bernardo Pino - 2024 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 41:232-269.
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