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Normative ethics

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Normative ethics is the study of ethical behaviour and is the branch of philosophical ethics that investigates questions regarding how one ought to act, in a moral sense.

Normative ethics is distinct from metaethics in that normative ethics examines standards for the rightness and wrongness of actions, whereas meta-ethics studies the meaning of moral language and the metaphysics of moral facts. Likewise, normative ethics is distinct from applied ethics in that normative ethics is more concerned with "what ought one be" rather than the ethics of a specific issue (e.g. if, or when, abortion is acceptable). Normative ethics is also distinct from descriptive ethics, as descriptive ethics is an empirical investigation of people's moral beliefs. In this context normative ethics is sometimes called prescriptive (as opposed to descriptive) ethics. However, on certain versions of the view of moral realism, moral facts are both descriptive and prescriptive at the same time.

Most traditional moral theories rest on principles that determine whether an action is right or wrong. Classical theories in this vein include utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and some forms of contractarianism. These theories mainly offered the use of overarching moral principles to resolve difficult moral decisions.[1]

Normative ethical theories

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There are disagreements about what precisely gives an action, rule, or disposition its ethical force. There are three competing views on how moral questions should be answered, along with hybrid positions that combine some elements of each: virtue ethics, deontological ethics, and consequentialism. Virtue ethics focuses on the character of those who are acting. In contrast, both deontological ethics and consequentialism focus on the status of the action, rule, or disposition itself, and come in various forms.

Virtue ethics

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Virtue ethics, advocated by Aristotle with some aspects being supported by Saint Thomas Aquinas, focuses on the inherent character of a person rather than on specific actions.[2] There has been a significant revival of virtue ethics since the 1950s,[3] through the work of such philosophers as G. E. M. Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Rosalind Hursthouse.[3][4][5]

Deontological ethics

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Deontology argues that decisions should be made considering the factors of one's duties and one's rights. Some deontological theories include:

Consequentialism

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Consequentialism argues that the morality of an action is contingent on the action's outcome or result. Consequentialist theories, varying in what they consider to be valuable (i.e., axiology), include:

  • Utilitarianism holds that an action is right if it leads to the most happiness for the greatest number of people. Prior to the coining of the term "consequentialism" by G. E. M. Anscombe in 1958[12] and the adoption of that term in the literature that followed, utilitarianism was the generic term for consequentialism, referring to all theories that promoted maximizing any form of utility, not just those that promoted maximizing happiness.
  • State consequentialism, or Mohist consequentialism, holds that an action is right if it leads to state welfare, through order, material wealth, and population growth.
  • Situational ethics emphasizes the particular context of an act when evaluating it ethically. Specifically, Christian forms of situational ethics hold that the correct action is the one that creates the most loving result, and that love should always be people's goal.
  • Intellectualism dictates that the best action is the one that best fosters and promotes knowledge.
  • Welfarism, which argues that the best action is the one that most increases economic well-being or welfare.
  • Preference utilitarianism, which holds that the best action is the one that leads to the most overall preference satisfaction.

Other theories

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  • Social contract theories are a wide range of postulates concerning the voluntary and consensual pacts between two or more individuals or collectives, whose actions related to the following of the clauses of said contract posited while it was in force should be respected and obeyed.[13][14]
  • Ethics of care, or relational ethics, founded by feminist theorists, notably Carol Gilligan, argues that morality arises out of the experiences of empathy and compassion. It emphasizes the importance of interdependence and relationships in achieving ethical goals.[15]
  • Pragmatic ethics is difficult to classify fully within any of the four preceding conceptions. This view argues that moral correctness evolves similarly to other kinds of knowledge—socially over the course of many lifetimes—and that norms, principles, and moral criteria are likely to be improved as a result of inquiry. Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey are known as the founders of pragmatism; a more recent proponent of pragmatic ethics was James D. Wallace.
  • Role ethics is based on the concept of family roles.

Egalitarianism

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In the realm of value, the position according to which a situation improves when inequality is reduced can be termed egalitarian. On a normative level, it can be defined as follows: we ought to minimize inequality. Nevertheless, a more precise definition would be: what we ought to do dependes on there being a reduction in inequality, or on the possibility of such a reduction occurring under certain conditions.

There are different ways to sustain an egalitarian position.[16] Some consider that it is worse for there to be more inequality and, furthermore, believe that the correct course of action consists in bringing about that which is better or less bad. Consequently, those who hold this view must also maintain that we ought to attempt to achieve a situation that is as egalitarian as possible. They will thus defende the following position:

Consequentialist egalitarianism: we ought to minimize inequality because it is worse for there to be more inequality.

Conversely, it may be the case that someone believes a more equal distribution is not necessarily better. This does not mean it is incompatible with considering that the correct course of action is still to act as prescribed by egalitarianismo. It is defined as follows:

Non consequentialist egalitarianism: we ought to minimize inequality, whether or not it is worse for there to be more inequality.

Egalitarianism is a position concerning the relative situation in which different individuals find themselves. It is not a position regarding greater or lesser diversity. Egalitarianism does not favor everyone acting in the same manner, nor does it provide any support to homogeneity. If anything, the opposite could be argued. Homogeinzation would run counter to equality, as it would worsen the situation of those who do no identify with a predetermined role, even if thar role is something other individuals desire for themselves. Eliminating this imposition to behave in a certain way would put an end to such an unequal situation.

Egalitarianism is not committed toy any specific theory of what things are valuable.[17] it is thus compatible with experientialism, preferentialism, and objetive list accounts. In fact, what egalitarianism prescribes that inequalities in value and disvalue enjoyed or suffered by different individuals should be reduced. A broader way of referring to this idea is outcome egalitarianism. Conversely, resource egalitarianism prescribes that inequalities in the means available to each individual to procure what is positive or avoid what is negative should be reduced.

There are two primary arguments in defense of resource egalitarianism. According to the first, it would be unfair for someone who works hard to enjoy or suffer the same as someone who did not bear such a burden. Given this, it could be considered fairer to distribute equal resources to everyone: from that point forward, if someone is happier as a result of exerting more effort with those resources, this would not pose a problem for this type of egalitarianism. According to the second argument, it would not be justifiable to give more resources to individuals with expensive tastes whose satisfaction is highly costly, even if this were necessary for those individuals to attain the same level of welfare as the rest. On the other hand, it has been argued against resource egalitarianism that different individuals may poses different characteristics for reason beyond their responsabillity, and it is unfair for this to result in an inequality of welfare and suffering. For example, if someone who requieres a wheelchair has the same resources as everyone else, their level of welfare will be lower. This does not appear fair.

In response to this, a third position has been defended. According to equal opportunity for welfare, inequalities in the amount of effort that different individuals must exert to reach the same level of welfare or to avoid a situation of suffering should be reduced. This position would avoid the problems that welfare egalitarianism would face if the two arguments in favor of resource egalitarianism are accepted, but it would also avoid the problems faced by the latter position.[18]

Sometimes, particularly outside the field of philosophy, the terms "equality" and "equity" are used in contrast to each other as follows. Equity is defined as equality of opportunity for welfare, equality of welfare, or equality of outcomes, whereas equality is used exclusively to refer to equality of resources. Based on this, it is argued that equity, rather than equality, is needed to defend a truly just situation for those who are worse off. This terminology does not correspond to how egalitarianism is understood in ethics and political theory. As demonstrated, the distinction made by these critics corresponds to a difference between different types of egalitarianism. What is termed equity is also equality.

A widespread form of egalitarianism is known as luck egalitarianism. According to this view, all forms of inequality must be reduced, including those resulting from mere luck rather than the action of an agent. It might be assumed that any egalitarian position would imply this, but that is not the case. There are perspectives according ti which we should only attempt to avoid inequalities caused by social injustices, not those due to brute luck. On the other hand, other positions may defend equal access to a distribution where luck implies an unequal outcome, which would not align with luck egalitarianism.

There is a tale from the Yoruba people, Orunmila and Alagemo, that illustrates this idea: Most of the Yoruba deities, called orishas, originally lacked powers. They requested them from Orunmila, another orisha deity who did have access to them. However, the various powers were neither equal in importance nor divisible. Therefore, Orunmila did not know how to distribute them fairly. In response, the chameleon Alagemo suggested the following solution to Orunmila: cast them randomly upon the earth, so that each deity would gather one or another as a matter of mere luck. Orunmila did so, considering it fair. Consequently, each orisha obtained a different power, whether better or worse, by pure chance.

This tale presents the idea that inequality can be justified if the process leading to it is fair. The fairness in this case stems from the fact that everyone participates on an equal footing in a process where mere luck determines an unequal outcome. As an alternative to this position, in a situation such as the one described, a luck egalitarian could propose other solutions, such as the joint ownership of the different powers or their rotating enjoyment.

For some egalitarian positions, the pursuit of less unequal distributions must be combined with a regard for individual merit. Thus, anyone who has intentionally done less than the rest to deserve the benefits they wish to receive, or who has attempted to benefit at the expense of other, should receive less. According to other positions, however, everyone should enjoy an equally good situation, regardless o their actions or how they have behaved toward others.[19]

Prioritarianism

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On a normative level, prioritarism can be understood as follows: we ought to make the total sum of value as large as possible, while giving extra importance to benefiting those who are worse off.

We have also seen that prioritarianism, despite its differences with egalitarianism, has similar implications. These similarities arise because, according to prioritarianism, the interests of those who worse off count more. However, prioritarianism differs from egalitarianism because it is not based on the idea that it is good to have more equality, or that it is correct to attempt to achieve greater equality,

To understand this difference in practice, we can consider the primary objection against egalitarianism defended by those who accept prioritarian positions. This objection is as follows:[20]

The leveling-down objection: Let us consider a world, say urras, where one half of the population has a level of net welfare minus ill-being of 100, and the other half has a level of 50. Let us think of another world, say Anarres, where everyone has a level of 50.

According to egalitarianism, there is a certain respect in which Anarres is better than Urras. However, for those who defend prioritarianism, this is unacceptable, since no one is made better off by the transition from Urras to Anarres, and some are indeed made worse off.

Those who employ this objection to question egalitarianism argue that it follows that equality cannot, by itself, be better than inequality. What can be better or worse is solely the situation in which different individuals fin themselves. Based on this argument, prioritarianism might be a preferable theory to egalitarianism. According to the former, we have reasons to prioritize preferable theory to egalitarianism. According to the former, we have reasons to prioritize increasing the value enjoyed by those who are in a worse situation. Crucially, this is not because those individuals are in a relatively unfavorable position compared to those who are better off, but simply because they are worse off than they themselves could be.

Egalitarians can respond to this by distinguishing between something being better in a certain respect and being better overall. In this way, it can be maintained that Anarres than Urras in a certain respect ( namely, the fact that value is better distributed in Anarres than in Urras) even though Urras is better overall because there is more total value in Urras. Let us think of a world with a distribution like Urras but with fewer resources. In it, one half has a level of welfare minus ill-being of 75, and the other half has a level of 25. Many people would consider this alternative world to be clearly worse than Anarres.

Of course, one could point out here that although prioritarians always end up defending that Urras is better than any other world that merely sought to maximize value, it would imply that Anarres is better than Urras. This is ture, although in practice no one actually defends such a positions. Egalitarianism only implies that less inequality is one of the things that can make a situation preferable to another, not the only one. Therefore, those who accept it do not agree with leveling down. This being the case, those who opt for a prioritarian position might do so simply because it is more parsimonious, as it only prescribes that the worse off an individual is, the more important it is to improve their situation.

It is worth noting that there is another position that differs from prioritarianism in the normative sense, but which has nevertheless also been characterized as prioritarian on occasion. This position prescribes that improving an individual´s situation becomes more valuable not the worse off they are, but the further away they are from the point where their interests are fully satisfied. Here, the relevant factor is no longer the absolute level of value that an individual enjoys, but how distant that level is from the maximum potential they could enjoy.[21]

Furthermore, just as in the case of egalitarianism, one may think that maximizing total value while giving priority to those who are worse off is the correct course of action because it is what is best:

Consequentialist prioritarianism is defined as follows: we ought to make the total sum of value as large as possible, giving extra importante to improving the situation of those who are worse off, because doing so is what is best.

However, it is possible to defend prioritarianism for reasons other than the pursuit of the best situation. Thus, non consequentialist prioritarianism is defined as follows: we ought to make the total sum of value as large as possible, giving extra importance to improving the situation of those who are worse off, but not because doing so is what is best. Likewise prioritarianism, like egalitarianism, is compatible with any conception of welfare.

Sufficientarianism

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A situation improves, or it is more correct to promote it, if instead of being in a position below what is sufficiently acceptable, it rises above that level. Beyond that point, once someone has reached this sufficiently good level it becomes indifferent whether their situation improves further.

According to this view, everything hinges on reaching a certain level of sufficiency.[22]Thus, let is suppose that in a specific place, Trasouto, the social situation and various life paths lead to the population falling below the sufficiency level. Of the different policies that could be pursued, two are identified that can end this situation without otherwise altering how things might unfold. Policy 1 corrects the situation slightly (just enough to place the population right above the sufficiency level. Policy 2 improves the well being of the inhabitants of this world much more, raising the population to a notably higher level of well.being.

Either of the situations resulting from the two policies would be better than the current one. However, the problem is that, according to sufficientarianism, they would also be equivalent to each other, given that in both cases everyone reaches the sufficiency level. While this may seem counterintuitive (as Policy 2 appears to result in greater well.being) it leads those who question sufficientarianism to argue that sufficiency, if it is to be an acceptable criterion, must be combined with some other principle. On the other hand, a sufficientarian position can be defend according to which a situation improves if more individuals reach the sufficiency level, and worsens if fewer individuals reach it. Yet, a more intuitive view of sufficientarianism seems to be one according to which a situation improves if there are fewer individuals below the sufficientarianism imply the same outcome if the number of individuals is equal, but not if it varies. For example, consider these two places, Uku an Kay:

Kay Uku
Individuals above the sufficiency level 5 million 100 million
Individuals below the sufficiency level 6 million 900 million

According to a version of sufficientarianism that focused on those above the sufficiency level, Uku would be better than Kay. However, if we follow a sufficientarian position centered on those who are worse off, the opposite conclusion would be reached. It is true that there are also other sufficientarian conceptions based on different factor, such as the percentage of the total population that falls above or below that level.

Suffering-focused ethics

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Suffering-focused ethics do not constitute a single tehor, but rather a family of positions defended from any of the standard ethical paradigms. In general terms, these positions prioritize actions aimed at reducing disvalue over other types of actions that can be carried out. An example of this is negative prioritarianism, according to which we ought to minimize the negative experiences that can be suffered, while giving priority to those who are suffering the most. Another example is an egalitarian position according to which we ought to focus on reducing suffering as much as possible and attempt to reduce the inequalities that cause some individuals to suffer tremendously.[23] Insofar as these theories maximize the achievement of our goals, they prescribe that we should attempt to make the world as less bad as possible. Furthermore, it is perfectly possible to defend egalitarian or prioritarian suffernig-focused theories that not strictly negative; these will also promote outcomes, although they will prioritize the reduction of negative ones. Their level of asymmetry can be highly diverse. On the other hand, deontological suffering-focused positions stipulate that the correct course of actions is to prioritize preventing negative things from occurring. This can be defended from the perspective of both absolute and prima facie duties.[24]

In turn, suffering-focused virtue ethics could be characterized as those according to which the character traits we ought to develop are those that make us more inclined to reduce suffering or other negative things. These are genuinely virtue-based positions if their focus is on the development and exercise of such dispositions. There is another suffering-focused approach to character (though it contains elements that appear deontological) which has likely had the greatest impact throughout history: the Buddhist perspective. These stances, although highly diverse, are based on the common idea that our lives are a continuous confrontation with different forms of suffering, which is fundamentally caused by cravings to achieve things and goals. By ridding ourselves of these cravings, we thereby eliminate suffering.[25] To achieve this, it is necessary to follow a path focused on that end, which among other things includes attempting to prevente the suffering of any other being. A widespread recommendation among Buddhist positions is that, once we are in a position to each such a state, we should renounce doing so and remain at the threshold of achieving it. Although this may disadvantage us, it allows us to dedicate ourselves to helping all other individuals with the capacity to suffer to become free from suffering.

Morality as a binding force

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It can be unclear what it means to say that a person "ought to do X because it is moral, whether they like it or not." Morality is sometimes presumed to have some kind of special binding force on behaviour, though some philosophers believe that, used this way, the word "ought" seems to wrongly attribute magic powers to morality. For instance, G. E. M. Anscombe worries that "ought" has become "a word of mere mesmeric force."[12]

If he is an amoral man he may deny that he has any reason to trouble his head over this or any other moral demand. Of course, he may be mistaken, and his life as well as others' lives may be most sadly spoiled by his selfishness. But this is not what is urged by those who think they can close the matter by an emphatic use of 'ought'. My argument is that they are relying on an illusion, as if trying to give the moral 'ought' a magic force.

— Philippa Foot[26]

The British ethicist Philippa Foot elaborates that morality does not seem to have any special binding force, and she clarifies that people only behave morally when motivated by other factors. Foot says "People talk, for instance, about the 'binding force' of morality, but it is not clear what this means if not that we feel ourselves unable to escape."[26] The idea is that, faced with an opportunity to steal a book because we can get away with it, moral obligation itself has no power to stop us unless we feel an obligation. Morality may therefore have no binding force beyond regular human motivations, and people must be motivated to behave morally. The question then arises: what role does reason play in motivating moral behaviour?

Motivating morality

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The categorical imperative perspective suggests that proper reason always leads to particular moral behaviour. As mentioned above, Foot instead believes that humans are actually motivated by desires. Proper reason, on this view, allows humans to discover actions that get them what they want (i.e., hypothetical imperatives)—not necessarily actions that are moral.

Social structure and motivation can make morality binding in a sense, but only because it makes moral norms feel inescapable, according to Foot.[26]

Feelings like shame and love are sometimes considered the only meaningful sense in which morality is binding. Absent those feelings, a person could behave "immorally" without remorse.

John Stuart Mill adds that external pressures, to please others for instance, also influence this felt binding force, which he calls human "conscience". Mill says that humans must first reason about what is moral, then try to bring the feelings of our conscience in line with our reason.[27] At the same time, Mill says that a good moral system (in his case, utilitarianism) ultimately appeals to aspects of human nature—which, must themselves be nurtured during upbringing. Mill explains:

This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilisation.

Mill thus believes that it is important to appreciate that it is feelings that drive moral behavior, but also that they may not be present in some people (e.g. psychopaths). Mill goes on to describe factors that help ensure people develop a conscience and behave morally.

Popular texts such as Joseph Daleiden's The Science of Morality: The Individual, Community, and Future Generations (1998) describe how societies can use science to figure out how to make people more likely to be good.

See also

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References

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  1. ↑ "Ethics - Vivian Johnson". Archived from the original on 2025-12-24.
  2. ↑ D. O. Thomas, Obedience to Conscience, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 64 (1963 - 1964), pp. 243-258.
  3. 1 2 Hursthouse, Rosalind; Pettigrove, Glen (2023), "Virtue Ethics", in Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2023 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2024-03-12
  4. ↑ Stohr, Karen; Wellman, Christopher Heath (2002). "Recent Work on Virtue Ethics". American Philosophical Quarterly. 39 (1): 49–72. ISSN 0003-0481. JSTOR 20010057.
  5. ↑ Simpson, Peter (1992). "Contemporary Virtue Ethics and Aristotle". The Review of Metaphysics. 45 (3): 503–524. ISSN 0034-6632. JSTOR 20129214.
  6. ↑ Johnson, Robert; Cureton, Adam (2022), "Kant's Moral Philosophy", in Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2024-03-12
  7. ↑ Rawls, John (1999). A theory of justice (Rev. ed.). Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-00077-3.
  8. ↑ Martin, Douglas (2002-11-26). "John Rawls, Theorist on Justice, Is Dead at 82". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2024-03-12.
  9. ↑ Paul, Ellen Frankel; Miller, Fred Dycus; Paul, Jeffrey (2006). Natural rights liberalism from Locke to Nozick. Cambridge: Cambridge university press. ISBN 978-0-521-61514-3.
  10. ↑ Heyman, Steven (2018-03-01). "The Light of Nature: John Locke, Natural Rights, and the Origins of American Religious Liberty". Marquette Law Review. 101 (3): 705.
  11. ↑ Scanlon, Thomas (1976). "Nozick on Rights, Liberty, and Property". Philosophy & Public Affairs. 6 (1): 3–25. ISSN 0048-3915. JSTOR 2265059.
  12. 1 2 Anscombe, Elizabeth. 1958. "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy 33(24).
  13. ↑ "Social Contract Theory | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy". Retrieved 2024-10-24.
  14. ↑ "Deontology and the Social Contract" (PDF).
  15. ↑ Hekman, Susan J. (1995). Moral voices, moral selves: Carol Gilligan and feminist moral theory. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press. ISBN 978-0-271-01483-8.
  16. ↑ Temkin, L. (1993) Inequality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  17. ↑ Cohen, G. A. (1989) “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice”, Ethics, 99, 906–944; Dworkin, R. (1993 [1990]) Ética privada e igualitarismo político, Barcelona: Paidós.
  18. ↑ In principle, the default egalitarian position would be welfare egalitarianism; see Temkin, Inequality. A well-known example of a proposal that, if put into practice, would correspond to what is prescribed by welfare egalitarianism is reflected in the slogan "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs"; see Marx, K. (1977 [1859]) Critique of the Gotha Programme, Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 12. It has been argued that Marxism is not strictly egalitarian, insofar as it does not prescribe the reduction of inequality as such, but rather other goals (such as the elimination of classes or the replacement of the mode of production); see, for example, Hirose, I. (2015) Egalitarianism, New York: Routledge, p. 5. In fact, it could also be maintained that Marxism is not a moral theory as such. Nonetheless, it is equally possible to argue that Marxism incorporates not only descriptions and predictions, but also prescriptions. And, in any case, that what the aforementioned slogan establishes would not be those other goals, but an ultimate end, which would be equality of welfare; see also Sypnowich, C. (2017) “What's Left in Egalitarianism? Marxism and the Limitations of Liberal Theories of Equality”, Philosophy Compass, 12/8, e12428. Regarding resource egalitarianism, see Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality; Clayton, M. (2000) “The Resources of Liberal Egalitarianism”, Imprints, 5, 63–84; Sandbu, M. E. (2004) “On Dworkin’s Brute-Luck–Option-Luck Distinction and the Consistency of Brute-Luck Egalitarianism”, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 3, 283–312. Regarding equal opportunity for welfare, see Arneson, R. J. (1989) “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare”, Philosophical Studies, 56, 77–93; Cohen, G. A. (1989) “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice”, Ethics, 99, 906–944. For potential critiques of this position, see Fleurbaey, M. (1995) “Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?”, Economics and Philosophy, 11, 25–55; Scanlon, T. M. (2000) “The Diversity of Objections to Inequality”, in Clayton, M. & Williams, A. (eds.) The Ideal of Equality, Hampshire: Macmillan, 41–59.
  19. ↑ Arneson, R. J. (2000) “Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism”, Ethics, 110, 339–49; Vallentyne, P. (2002) “Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities”, Ethics, 112, 529–57; Barry, N. (2006) “Defending Luck Egalitarianism”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 23, 89–107.
  20. ↑ Parfit, D. (2004) Personas, racionalidad y tiempo, Madrid: Síntesis, cap. 5.
  21. ↑ Raz, J. (1986) The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press
  22. ↑ Frankfurt, H. (1987) “Equality as a Moral Ideal”, Ethics, 98, 21–43; Crisp, R. (2003) “Equality, Priority, and Compassion”, Ethics, 113, 745–763; Benbaji, Y. (2005) “The Doctrine of Sufficiency: A Defence”, Utilitas, 17, 310–332; Shields, L. (2020) “Sufficientarianism”, Philosophy Compass, 15, 1–10; el clásico en la crítica del suficientismo es Casal, P. (2006) “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough”, Ethics, 116, 296–326.
  23. ↑ In the philosophical literature, this position has not been described as constituting a form of negative egalitarianism, as that term is used to denote those stances according to which inequality is negative (such that equality possesses only a secondary instrumental positive value). In contrast, according to positive egalitarianism, equality is positive in a way that is not instrumental, unlike in negative egalitarianism.
  24. ↑ Schopenhauer, A. (2023 [1819]) The World as Will and Representation, vol. I, Madrid: Trotta; (2009 [1851]) On the Sufferings of the World, Madrid: Público; Ryder, R. D. (2001) Painism: A Modern Morality, London: Centaur; Leighton, J. (2011) The Battle for Compassion: Ethics in an Apathetic Universe, New York: Algora; Gloor, L. (2019 [2016]) “The Case for Suffering-Focused Ethics”, Center on Long-Term Risk, https://longtermrisk.org/the-case-for-suffering-focused-ethics; Briones Marrero, A. (2022) “Una defensa de las axiologías centradas en el sufrimiento” [A Defense of Suffering-Focused Axiologies], Agora: Papeles de Filosofía, 41, 13–25; Rozas, M. (2022) “Una tipología de las éticas asimétricas” [A Typology of Asymmetrical Ethics], Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 27, 29–40; Vinding, M. (2022) Essays on Suffering-Focused Ethics, Copenhagen: Ratio Ethica, pt. 1.
  25. ↑ The state in which we would no longer suffer is known in Buddhism as nirvana, which corresponds to what is known as moksha in Hindu and Jain conceptions. The idea of the existence of suffering, its cause, its remedy, and the method to achieve that remedy, constitute what are known in Buddhism as the "Four Noble Truths." See Gautama, S. (2000 [ca. 5th century BCE]) The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, Boston: Wisdom; Saddhatissa, H. (1997) Buddhist Ethics, Somerville: Wisdom. Jainism shares many elements with Buddhism and appears to place greater importance on the reduction of suffering than on the promotion of positive well-being; hence, its morality could also be considered suffering-focused, although less markedly so than in the case of Buddhism. See Umaswati (2010 [ca. 1st-5th century]) That Which Is: Tattvartha Sutra, New Haven: Yale University Press (one of the few texts accepted by the two primary branches of Jainism, Digambara and Śvetāmbara—the latter of which critiques the Digambara, among other things, for its sexism); Tiwari, K. N. (1998) Classical Indian Ethical Thought: A Philosophical Study of Hindu, Jaina and Bauddha Morals, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass; regarding the focus on suffering, see Contestabile, B. (2016) “The Denial of the World from an Impartial View”, Contemporary Buddhism, 17, 49-61; Culbertson, K. (2021) Embracing the Non-Ideal: A Suffering-Oriented Ethical Approach, doctoral dissertation, University of Connecticut.
  26. 1 2 3 Foot, Philippa. (2009). Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. In S. M. Cahn, & P. Markie, Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues (pp. 556-561). New York: Oxford University Press.
  27. ↑ "John Stuart Mill (1863). Utilitarianism. Chapter 3: Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility".
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